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Evaluation of the Substitutability between U.S. and Canadian Softwood Lumber 
Abstract: Softwood lumber trade between the United States and Canada has worldwide 
attention due to its economic importance and for lengthy dispute.  Most studies have 
focused on welfare effects of the dispute, while few studies have evaluated the question 
of likeness of product.  This study evaluates the substitutability between U.S. and 
Canadian softwood lumber including other countries’ softwood lumber.  Price elasticities 
are derived from the linear approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand System.  The 
results show that softwood lumber imports to the U.S. from various countries are indeed 
substitutes for U.S. softwood lumber.  The Morishima elasticities of substitution indicate 
that other countries have a higher degree of substitutability than Canadian softwood 
lumber. 
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Evaluation of the Substitutability between U.S. and Canadian Softwood Lumber 
Worldwide, the United States is the largest consumer of softwood lumber and Canada is 
the largest producer.  In 2004, these countries consumed and produced 44% and 28% 
respectively of the world’s total production and consumption of softwood lumber 
(USDA, 2006).  The bulky nature of softwood lumber and the proximity of the two 
countries have made the United States and Canada important trading partners.  In 2004, 
the United States imported approximately $7.4 billion worth of softwood lumber, 90% of 
which was imported from Canada (USITC, 2006).  Imported Canadian softwood lumber 
represents 41%
1 of softwood lumber consumed in the United States.  Overshadowing the 
economic importance of this trade relationship, however, has been the decades-long 
lumber trade dispute. 
Since 1981, four softwood lumber disputes between Canada and the United States 
have focused on the U.S. claim that Canadian softwood lumber is subsidized and sold in 
the U.S. at below the cost of production.  To address this claim, the United States 
established countervailing and antidumping duties on Canadian softwood lumber based 
on the determinations of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
The Dispute 
In Canada, stumpage fees are not determined by the market; instead the Canadian 
government grants softwood lumber companies the harvest rights to the standing timber 
on Crown Lands in exchange for service and maintenance obligations (e.g., road-
building, protection against fire, disease, and insects) (WTO, 2003).  The United States 
considers this practice to be a subsidy to Canadian lumber producers who ultimately 
export their lumber to the United States.  The United States claims that selling the   4 
standing timber in the open market, as is done in the U.S., would fetch higher stumpage 
prices than the current exchange policy used in Canada.  Higher stumpage fees would 
reduce the Canadian share of the U.S. softwood lumber market allowing U.S. lumber 
producers to have a higher share of the market. 
In response, Canada argues that the services provided by the softwood lumber 
companies should be taken into account in computing the stumpage fees.  In addition, 
Canada contends that its vast endowment of forest land provides a natural competitive 
advantage over its competitors, that U.S. firms are not efficient, and furthermore it 
opposes U.S. intervention into Canadian sovereignty. 
The U.S. softwood lumber producers claim that imports from subsidized 
Canadian softwood lumber cause loss of sales and jobs.  U.S. consumer groups assert that 
such detriment could not occur because Canadian softwood lumber is not a substitute for 
U.S. softwood lumber (ACAH, 2002).  Currently, all softwood lumber imports from 
Canada falling under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code 440710 are subject to 
a tariff of 22 %.  This is a high level of aggregation which arguably protects some U.S. 
lumber producers unnecessarily. 
Objective 
This study evaluates the substitutability between U.S. and Canadian softwood lumber by 
computing price elasticities derived from the linear approximation of the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (LA/AIDS).  Whether or not Canadian lumber is subsidized falls outside 
the scope of this study.  But if subsidies exist, Canadian lumber can only be detrimental 
to the U.S. lumber producers to the extent that their products are substitutes.  Absent   5 
close substitutability, U.S. producers cannot be injured and therefore the case for 
protective policies is weakened. 
Literature Review 
A myriad of articles relate to this very trade dispute, however two specifically address the 
issue of substitutability.  Nagubadi et al. use a translog cost function for the housing 
industry by accounting for six species of lumber which include: Spruce and Fir (and 
Lodgepole Pine, and Spruce), Southern Pine, Douglas Fir, Hem Fir (and White Fir, and 
other fir), Cedar, and others (Ponderosa Pine, other pine, Redwood, Eastern White Pine, 
other eastern softwoods, Western White Pine, Sugar Pine, other western softwoods).  
Their results show that substitutability exists between Canadian Spruce-Pine-Fir (SPF) 
and the untreated U.S. Southern Yellow Pine (SYP).  Other products appear to be 
independent markets, and some are even complements of U.S. products.  In contrast, 
Lewandrowski et. al., by developing a short term stochastic model using mathematical 
programming from an inventory approach, found that imports of Canadian lumber do 
compete with U.S. lumber in the U.S. market. 
This study adds to the small literature by utilizing the LA/AIDS and calculating 
price elasticities to analyze the substitutability of U.S. softwood lumber with that from 
countries other than Canada (Mexico, Brazil, and New Zealand). 
Methodology 
The linear approximation to the AIDS model arose following the recognition that the 
estimation of non-linear models can be troublesome.  Deaton and Muellbauer argued that 
with collinear prices, it may be appropriate to use the Stone Price Index to approximate 






⎛ + + =
j
i i ij i i P
M
P S * ln ) ln( β γ α        ( 1 )  
where αi is the constant coefficient in the ith share equation, γij is the slope coefficient 
associated with the jth good in the ith share equation, pj is the price on the jth good. M is 






i iq p M
1
          ( 2 )  
in which qi is the quantity demanded for the ith good. P* is the price index defined by the 
Stone Price Index is  
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The Stone Price Index does not involve model coefficients; then it is not invariant 
to scaling in prices and therefore we normalize them by the mean of prices.  After 
substituting the stone price index in (1) and with some simplifications we obtain the 
expression to be estimated: 
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Notice that the share equations are linear in the parameters.  Using Monte Carlo 
simulation, we estimate this seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  When estimating the 
parameters of this system we need to impose certain restrictions: symmetry, adding up, 
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In the estimation process, we omitted one share equation to avoid singularity of 
the error covariance matrix.  Also, we do not need to impose all the adding up restrictions 
because we only estimate five equations out of six.  However, we will use these 
restrictions to recover the coefficients for the omitted equation.  One advantage of the 
AIDS model is that the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are easily imposed and 
tested.   
In the HTS system, imports of softwood lumber are assigned the following 6 digit 
code 440710.  The description at this level of aggregation is labeled: wood sawn or 
chipped lengthwise, sliced or peeled, whether or not planed, sanded or finger-jointed, of a 
thickness exceeding 6 millimeters, coniferous (USITC Database).  Softwood lumber 
quantity and price data for the Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and New Zealand was retrieved 
from the USITC database using the HTS number.  Prices were obtained by dividing 
customs values of imports by the imported volume.  These prices do not include tariffs.   
Quantities for the United States were retrieved from Production, Supply and 
Demand tables from the USDA.  U.S. prices were obtained by dividing export values by 
quantity exported.  These data was obtained from the Online Statistics Database of the 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations.  Quantities are measured in 
cubic meters, and prices are measured in US dollars.  
Results 
Table 1 reports the results of our estimation.  The R-square for the system of equations is 
0.93.  In this experiment, the tests of overall significance and likelihood ratio also show 
low p-values which reject the null hypotheses.
2  These encouraging results strongly 
explain the demand behavior of softwood lumber for the United States.  In Table 1,   8 
LNSP1, LNSP2, LNSP3, LNSP4, LNSP5, and LNSP6 correspond with the natural 
logarithm of the U.S. lumber price, Canadian lumber price, Mexican lumber price, 
Brazilian lumber price, and the price of lumber form New Zealand respectively and the 
expenditure shares are indexed in a consistent manner.  Using these results, we compute 
the own and cross price elasticities for the compensated and uncompensated case using 
the formulas developed by Alston and Green for the LA/AIDS. 
Table 1. Estimation Results 
a 
VARIABLE  LNSP1 LNSP2 LNSP3 LNSP4 LNSP5 LNSP6  LNX  LNP 
Share 1  0.1827  -0.1806  -0.0006  -0.0013  -0.0012  0.0009  -0.0591  -0.0591 
  0.5791  -0.6271  -0.2514  -0.1031  -0.1091  0.1101  -0.5491  -0.5491 
Share 2  -0.1806  0.1764  -0.0002  0.0030  0.0013  0.0000  0.0570  0.0570 
  -0.6271  0.6708  -0.0936  0.2753  0.1289  0.0013  0.5805  0.5805 
Share 3  -0.0006  -0.0002  0.0003  0.0008  -0.0001  -0.0002  0.0007  0.0007 
  -0.2514  -0.0936  1.0266  2.1959  -0.4141  -0.6791  0.8053  0.8053 
Share 4  -0.0013  0.0030  0.0008  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0017  0.0006  0.0006 
  -0.1031  0.2753  2.1959  -0.2926  -0.8388  -2.3851  0.1402  0.1402 
Share 5  -0.0012  0.0013  -0.0001  -0.0005  0.0003  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002 
   -0.1091  0.1289  -0.4141  -0.8388  0.5298  0.5983  0.0431  0.0431 
a Coefficients are in bold, t-statistic is in italics 
The uncompensated price elasticities can be found in Table 2.  These own price 
elasticities are negative, which is consistent with demand theory.  The uncompensated 
price elasticities of demand show that other countries’ softwood lumber is a complement 
to U.S. softwood lumber with the exception of New Zealand.   
Table 2. Uncompensated Price Elasticities 
 United  States  Canada  Mexico  Brazil  Chile  New  Zealand 
United States  -0.66  -0.25  -0.0008  -0.002  -0.002  0.002 
Canada -0.63  -0.54  -0.0007  0.01  0.003  -0.0003 
Mexico -1.00  -0.42  -0.71  0.82  -0.11  -0.24 
Brazil -0.47  0.80  0.24  -1.09  -0.15  -0.50 
Chile -0.42  0.40  -0.03  -0.17  -0.91  0.08 
New Zealand  0.22  -0.12  -0.12  -0.89  0.13  -0.59 
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When adjusting for income effects, compensated price elasticities in Table 3, we 
find that all countries under this study become substitutes for U.S. softwood lumber.  The 
results of Table 3 indicate that U.S. demand for softwood lumber from these exporting 
countries is more responsive to changes in U.S. price than the U.S. demand for domestic 
softwood is to changes in prices of imported softwood.  This is suggestive of strong 
demand for domestic wood in the U.S. which is likely a function of the logistical 
difficulties of importing softwood.  Additionally, when U.S. price changes, cross price 
elasticities for Brazil, Chile, and New Zealand are greater than Canada’s and Mexico’s.  
This would indicate a higher substitutability for softwood lumber coming from Brazil, 
Chile, and New Zealand. 
Table 3. Compensated Price Elasticities 
 United  States  Canada  Mexico  Brazil  Chile  New  Zealand 
United States  -0.07  0.06  0.0001  0.002  0.001  0.003 
Canada 0.12  -0.14  0.0004  0.01  0.007  0.002 
Mexico 0.07  0.15  -0.71  0.82  -0.10  -0.23 
Brazil 0.29  1.20  0.24  -1.10  -0.15  -0.49 
Chile 0.26  0.76  -0.03  -0.17  -0.90  0.08 
New Zealand  1.11  0.35  -0.12  -0.89  0.13  -0.59 
 
Allen and Morishima elasticities of substitution where also computed.  However, 
only the latter are presented in this paper.  We do not report the Allen elasticities because 
they were sensitive to the small expenditure shares of Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and New 
Zealand as compared to Canada.  That is, the expenditure shares predetermined the 
relative magnitudes.   
The Morishima elasticity of substitution, reported in Table 4, is used to measure 
the change in relative softwood lumber demand from different countries for a change in a 
price.  In the first column, Morishima elasticities confirm the previous compensated cross   10 
price elasticity results.  The Morishima elasticity for Canadian relative to U.S. softwood 
lumber demand, with respect to a change in the U.S. softwood lumber price, is the second 
smallest elasticity arising from a change in the U.S. price.  Furthermore, the smallest 
Morishima elasticity of substitution arising from a change in the Canadian price is for the 
ratio of demand for Canadian softwood lumber relative to demand for U.S. softwood 
lumber.  These results imply that softwood lumber from the countries other than Canada 
are closer substitutes for U.S. domestic softwood.  This would appear to strengthen the 
Canadian case in the softwood dumping dispute. 
Table 4. Morishima elasticities of substitution 
   United States  Canada  Mexico  Brazil  Chile  New Zealand 
United States     0.21  0.71  1.09  0.90  0.59 
Canada 0.19     0.71  1.10  0.91  0.59 
Mexico 0.14  0.29     1.91  0.80  0.35 
Brazil 0.36  1.34  0.95     0.75  0.09 
Chile 0.33  0.90  0.67  0.92     0.67 
New Zealand  1.18  0.49  0.58  0.20  1.04    
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The softwood lumber dispute between U.S. and Canada is one of the longest and costliest 
in recent trade history.  Arguments surrounding the imposition of trade barriers have 
centered on the role of Canada’s unique approach to forest management.  Most studies 
have focused on welfare effects, while few studies have evaluated the question of 
likeness of product.  As a contribution towards filling this gap in the literature, we have 
evaluated the substitutability between U.S. and Canadian softwood lumber using the 
Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS).   
The results show that softwood lumber imports to the U.S. from various countries 
are indeed substitutes for U.S. softwood lumber.  Elasticities of substitution using the   11 
Morishima definition indicate that other countries have a higher degree of substitutability 
with U.S. domestic product compared to Canadian softwood lumber.  The consequence to 
trade is that if the United States imposes trade barriers against Canada, other countries 
with whom trade is not restricted could easily substitute for Canadian lumber in the U.S. 
market.  This would nullify the protective effect of the barrier from the U.S. perspective.  
It is important, however, to note that there might result in a substantial welfare effects 
which would manifest in the form of a transfer of welfare from Canadian softwood 
exporters to softwood exporters from Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and New Zealand.  U.S. 
consumers might also experience some welfare losses due the imperfect substitution 
between Canadian and other sources of softwood in the U.S. market.  U.S. producers 
would benefit but less so than their foreign competitors. 
Future research should make a distinction between the different varieties of 
Canadian and U.S. softwood lumber.  U.S. production would need to be categorized 
along side the HTS system used when importing softwood lumber or a standard for 
comparison would need to be established.  Then, the same procedure used in this study 
can be applied, allowing us to better understand the market for different softwood lumber 
varieties.   12 
                                                 
1 Authors’ calculation based on imports data from the USITC Online Database, and consumption data from 
the PS&D Online Tables. 
2 Test of the overall significance = 45.295; Chi-square with 20 d.f.; p-value= 0.00101 
Likelihood ratio test of diagonal covariance matrix = 360.65; Chi-square with 10 d.f.; p-value= 0.00000 
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